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I. INTRODUCTION: BIODIVERSITY AND FEDERALISM
This Article examines the practice and jurisprudence of federalism through
the lens of biodiversity protection in California.' Important intergovernmental
biodiversity protection experiments are underway in southern California as well
as in other parts of the country which neither fit easily into conventional political
theories of federalism nor into the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence.
Federal, state, and local governments are cooperating with property owners and
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B., 1962, LL.B.,
1965, Stanford University. I wish to disclose that since 1992, I have been a consultant to the California
Resources Agency for the Orange and San Diego Counties' Natural Community Conservation plans discussed
in this article. The views expressed in this article are solely mine and in no way reflect the position of the
Resources Agency. All of the information discussed in this article comes solely from public record documents.
An earlier version of this paper was given at the To Devolve, or Not to Devolve?: The (D)Evolution of
Environmental Law Symposium on March 15, 1996, at McGeorge School of Law.
1. This Article is an expansion of some of the themes raised in an earlier article exploring the emerging
federalism issues in a variety of on-going biodiversity protection experiments. See A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity
Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995).
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other stakeholders to implement a bioregional biodiversity protection strategy.2
These experiments are characterized by the federal government's attempts to
protect biodiversity without the actual displacement of state law and the central
importance of actors with no formal status in federalism jurisprudence, local units
of government,3 in the formulation and implementation of biodiversity protection
strategies. In short, for a variety of reasons, we are seeing federalism without
preemption.4
This emerging pattern of federalism is initially surprising to students of
natural resources and environmental law. The displacement of state law was the
central issue in natural resources federalism from the New Deal to the 1960s. The
most interesting issue was whether the federal government had the power to
displace state law. If the federal government had the power, it followed that the
state law should be displaced to further an important national interest. In areas
such as water administration, states were so hostile to federal proprietary and
administrative claims that displacement of state law seemed like the only effective
way to vindicate federal interests frustrated by state and local opposition. For
example, writing in 1964, a distinguished California water lawyer chastised the
states for continuing to argue that the federal government lacked the power to
enforce the 160-acre limitation or claim federal reserved rights because "[t]he
vice of this line of argument is that it still conceives the states and the United
States as jealous rivals bent on mutual frustration." 6 Preemption of state law has
been less of an issue in environmental regulation because the basic pollution
control programs allow state standards that exceed federal ones,7 but federal
preemption has been frequently asserted by both the government and regulated
2. Bioregionalism is a synthesis of European regional geography, modem ecological thinking, and
the growing attachment of the idea of a sense of place. The basic idea is to define regions which share common
ecological and cultural characteristics and use this area as a basis for the development'and implementation of
more environmentally sensitive resource development and management strategies. See Robert W. Adler,
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1000-03 (1995); Keane Callahan,
Bioregionalism: Wiser Planning for the Environment, LAND USE & ZONING DIGEST, Aug. 1993, at 3. For
further discussion, see also infra note 9 and accompanying text.
3. See Community Comm. Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,53-54 (1982).
4. Stephen A. Gardbaum, in The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELLL. REV. 767 (1994), argues that,
contrary to conventional thinking, the displacement of state law under the Supremacy Clause and preemption
have separate constitutional justifications. Preemption is an exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause
because it arises "only where the states and the federal government have concurrent power." Id. at 770. The
biodiversity protection experiments described in this Article raise preemption issues under this definition.
5. There is a lively continuing debate about the legacy of western water development, and one
persistent theme in the debate is that local irrigation districts exercised too much control over federal water
allocation at the expense of social equity and environmental protection. Compare ARTHUR MASS & RAYMOND
L ANDERSON ... AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE: CONFuCr, GROWTH, AND JusTicE IN ARID ENviRoNMENTS
(1978) with DANIEL WORsTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDrrY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
WEST (1985).
6. B. Abbott Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1, 37 (1964).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, 949 F.2d 1409, 1443-44 (6th Cir. 1991);
Homestake Mining Co. v. United States EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (D.S.D. 1979).
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parties. Like everything in the 90s, modem natural resource and environmental
management issues are not as simple as they once were. They raise complex
federalism issues beyond the proper allocation of exclusive authority, and thus,
it is ultimately not surprising that preemption plays a less important role than it
once did. If there is to be any effective biodiversity protection, it will be accom-
plished through cooperation and blended authority rather than conflict and the
delineation of exclusive spheres of competence.
Biodiversity protection raises especially complex federalism problems
because of its site specific nature and the refusal of ecosystems and bioregions9
to conform to political boundaries. In the past five years, the protection of bio-
diversity has emerged as one of the major objectives of environmental law.
Biodiversity protection is particularly acute in California because so many people
share a biodiversity hot spot with the flora and fauna. The leading proponent of
biodiversity protection, Edward 0. Wilson, identifies 18 global biodiversity hot
spots in his influential book, The Diversity of Life. l0 The California floristic
province "stretching from southern Oregon to Baja, California and recognized by
botanists as a separate evolutionary center... contains one fourth of all the plant
species found in the United States and Canada combined."" This landscape is
shared with some thirty-two million humans and thus biodiversity loss through
habitat destruction is acute,'2 and human settlement patterns that consume
sensitive habitats are extremely difficult to modify.
Biodiversity protection in California also has an international dimension,
which is important in southern California because the bioregion extends into
Mexico. International law does not mandate that the United States take additional
biodiversity protection measures, but the entry into force of the 1992 Biodiversity
8. See cases cited infra note 21.
9. As previously discussed, bioregionalism proceeds from the assumption that natural units such as
river basins or other ecosystems have an integrity which must be respected by humans. Thus, the history of
adaptation is not the traditional one of the triumph over hostile environments but a study of the consequences
of the respect and disrespect for the region displayed over time by human users. Australia is pioneering the use
of this technique to develop new biodiversity protection management initiatives to cope with systemic drought
and land degradation. See generally J. M. POWELL, THE EMERGENCE OF BIOREGIONALISM IN THE MURRAY-
DARLING BASIN (1994).
10. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THEDIvERSrrYOFLiFE (1992).
11. Id. at 261. The uniqueness of the California Floristic Province was recognized by the state's early
scientists. A study of California's pioneer scientists concludes that:
the region's scientists had spent a generation trying to convey.., that the view of nature most
beneficial to humanity was one in which nature was not treated as a commodity and humans were
seen as the center of creation-not because humans were less important than the rest of nature, but
because the prevailing anthropocentric vision of the earth as a marketplace was a distorted and
ultimately self-destructive way of interpreting the dynamics of the biosphere.
MICHAEL L. SMITH, PACIC VISIONS: THE CALIFORNIA SCIE TIsrs AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1859-1915 192-93
(1987).
12. See LIFE ON THE EDGE: A GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA'S ENDANGERED NATURAL RESOURCES: WILDLIFE
(Carl G. Thelander & Margo Crabtree eds., 1994).
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Convention reenforces existing United States domestic initiatives 3 and provides
an additional rationale to err on the side of protection in the face of the usual high
level of scientific uncertainty. For example, commentators assert that a pre-
cautionary principle is emerging out of recent regional and global agreements
14
such as the ozone convention and regional hazardous waste treaties. The pre-
cautionary principle posits that states have a duty to take "remedial action even
in the absence of provable environmental harm, simply on the evidence of
significant risk thereof."' 15 The principle is still vague and it is not well integrated
with the law of state responsibility for transboundary environmental damage. But,
the precautionary principle has been extended from pollution prevention to bio-
diversity conservation and is incorporated into the preamble of the Biodiversity
Convention, although the burden of proof issue is unresolved.
As the global climate change debate illustrates, the allocation of the burden
of proof is essential to the implementation of the precautionary principle. The
logic of the principle suggests that the burden should be placed on the party
alleging that there is insufficient evidence to justify precautionary regulation.
However, the higher the uncertainty, the easier it should be to shift the burden to
the party imposing the regulation. The Convention can be characterized as a
recognition that a nation has a duty to practice sustainable development for
internal as well as external reasons. However, at the present time, this is too
radical an extension of the precautionary principle. At most, a nation probably has
a duty to avoid foreseeable, significant risks to other states. 16 Thus, at present the
Convention reenforces a state's discretion to err on the side of caution in the face
of the usual high level of scientific uncertainty.
13. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological
Diversity, 31 INT'L LEGAL MATERLALS 818, 882 (1992). The Convention entered into force on December 29,
1993. President Clinton has signed the Convention, but as of June 1996, Congress had not ratified the
Convention. For a good discussion of the Convention, see PHILLIPE SANDS, I PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENvIRoNMENTAL LAw 381-87 (1995) and Catherine Tinker, Responsibility for Biological Diversity
Conservation Under International Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777 (1995).
14. See Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law. Institutionalizing
Caution, 4 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303 (1992); Tinker, supra note 13, at 797-98.
15. Gunther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International Law,
in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & INTERNATIONAL LAW 59, 99 (1991).
16. See Tinker, supra note 13, at 798.
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II. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF DIMINISHED
FEDERAL CAPACITY
A. The Decline of National Authority in an Era of Limits
Biodiversity protection is habitat protection,17 and thus it is extremely
difficult to implement in areas of human settlement because land use regulations
infringe on both public and private choices about the exploitation and use of
public and private land and related water resources. Habitat protection requires
some combination of the dedication of significant amounts of land to habitat
reserves, adaptive management of private and public land and new management
initiatives for public lands dedicated to commodity production such as mining,
timber harvesting and livestock grazing. Effective protection equally requires new
controls on private land suitable for urban development as well as on existing
agricultural lands and unprecedented levels of intra-agency aid intergovernmental
cooperation. Single use public land management must be reoriented to accom-
modate biodiversity conservation.18 However, the federal government's con-
siderable powers under the Property 9 and Commerce 20 clauses and the Court's
17. There are exceptions to this repeated truism such as the need to reduce sensitive species exposure
to pesticides and other toxins.
18. See JIM ROBBINS, LAST REFUGE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL SHOWDOWN IN YELLOWSTONE AND THE
AMERICAN WEST 101-32 (1993).
19. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,539 (1976).
20. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 314, 329-30 (1981) (holding
that the Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate local land uses pursuant to the Surface Mine Control
and Reclamation Act). The Supreme Court's decision, in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995),
undermines some of the assumed Commerce Clause justification for biodiversity protection. Lopez invalidated
the Gun Free Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(b), 104 Stat. 4844, 4844-49 (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 922(q)), because it did not regulate economic activity that affected interstate commerce. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. at 1630-34. Biodiversity protection requires land use controls, and federal legislation that directly or
indirectly could be characterized as the regulation of noncommercial interstate activities. See Hodel, 452 U.S.
at 329-30. Thus, cases such as Hodel, that upheld the Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act because coal
moved in interstate commerce and coal mining reduced the utility of land for commercial, industrial, and
agricultural activities that could effect interstate commerce, and that was approved in Lopez, might not apply
to the Endangered Species Act, the cornerstone of biodiversity protection. See John P. Dwyer, The Commerce
Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environment, 25 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS
10421, 10428-30 (1995). Compare id. with Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 795 (1996). Gardbaum offers an alternative approach to the limits of federal power over local activities
affecting interstate commerce. In brief, he argues that, informed by the "hard look" doctrine developed in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-17 (1971), and the European Community
principle of subsidiary, the Necessary and Proper Clause can be read to police congressional exercises of
preemption. This approach would allow cooperative biodiversity protection initiatives, backed by the threat
of federal preemption, because Congress would likely meet his test that Congress affirmatively determine that
national regulation is required after affording full weight to the states' interest in autonomy.
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refusal to develop a Tenth Amendment jurisprudence of exclusive state com-
petence2' are not as helpful as they are in other contexts because the full exercise
of the constitutional power of the national government to achieve this objective
is perceived as an unacceptable intrusion on state and local sovereignty
2
To further complicate the problem, neither federal power nor federal environ-
mental laws are well adapted to the goal of biodiversity habitat preservation for
two primary reasons. First, biodiversity preservation does not fit neatly into either
the resource preservation or command and control pollution control paradigms
on which federal environmental law is built. Second, current biodiversity pro-
tection experiments, driven by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), illustrate a
paradox which is a result of the historical refusal to delegate land use and water
allocation authority to the national government. The ESA's primary objective is
the preservation of individual species by listing them as threatened or endangered.
Listed species are protected against federal activities which jeopardize their
survival2 or state, local, and private activities which threaten to take the species.
Under the ESA and Clean Water Act,24 the federal government has asserted the
authority to preempt state land and water laws to protect endangered species and
prevent water pollution, but the exercise of preemptive power is difficult if not
impossible to sustain because the success of these experiments depends on state
and local cooperation.2s Ultimately, the federal government has had to defer to
21. Federal environmental regulation, especially land use control, has often been challenged as a
violation of the 10th Amendment after the Court resurrected the 10th Amendment as ajudicial limitation on
federal regulatory power in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976), but soon interred
it again in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). Thus, the 10th Amendment
has never served as a limitation on federal environmental regulatory authority. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at
330. However, the Court is once again moving to revive the 10th Amendment as a source of exclusive state
power. For example, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) holds that the federal government
cannot compel the states to implement a federal program. The Court's most recent opinion, Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123-24, cert. denied sub nom. Alabama v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians,
116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996), articulates the need for the expanded protection of exclusive state competence.
Regardless of the merits of the Court's much disputed effort to reverse 60 plus years of constitutional practice,
the revived 10th Amendment has little direct implication for bioregional experiments because they are based
on inter-governmental cooperation rather than compulsion or the direct exercise of federal authority. The
European Union, in contrast, recognizes the principle of subsidiarity which posits that, where possible,
regulation should take place at the national rather than community level. See George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332,
338-44 (1994).
22. See J.B. Ruh, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating
Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 672 (1995).
23. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West 1986 and Supp. 1996),
requires that all federal agencies or their permittees consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service if a federally
funded or authorized activity, such as a road through a national forest or a dam, would jeopardize the continued
survival of the species. If the Service issues ajeopardy finding, the duty to protect the species is absolute unless
exempted by a cabinet level "God Squad."
24. 33 U.S.C.A §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
25. See infra Section Ill.
1634
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state and local governments and rely on loosely structured cooperative partnership
agreements to achieve these objectives?2
History also complicates biodiversity preservation. Many of the actual
federalism patterns that are emerging continue the legacy of state and local
opposition, especially in the west, to all federal resource management initiatives. 27
The federal government's power to manage land and water resources, even on
federal lands, required considerable deference to state and local interests and thus
the full extent of federal power was seldom asserted. This is often because
Congress refused to fund the necessary management institutions.28 There are,
however, some important differences between the present and past political and
legal landscapes. Today, three factors shape biodiversity federalism.
First, the federal government no longer wields the power of the budget to
induce states to comply. In fact, Congress often uses the power negatively by
refusing to fund programs in order to encourage state non-compliance. 9 The
comparative lack of resources available to the federal resource management
agencies often makes them facilitators rather than the governors of a system. For
example, the United States Department of the Interior has the complete power to
allocate the water from the Colorado River in times of shortage, 0 but the major
manager of the system is the Metropolitan Water District. With the blessing of the
United States Department of the Interior, it negotiated a cost-sharing arrangement
with the Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA). The two districts will share
the costs of lining the All-American Canal and SNWA will pick up 30,000 acre
feet of Colorado River Water.3'
Second, the effective exercise of federal power is less than its actual power
because the consequences of full exercise of the power may be too costly to agen-
cies because it erodes the agencies' political bases. The most dramatic example
of this problem is enforcement of the Endangered Species Act. Under the ESA,
the federal government has the power to veto the exercise of state water rights or
26. For the most extensive theoretical discussion of the tension between local and national biodiversity
control and the new forms of cooperative management that are emerging in this area, see Lee P. Breckenridge,
Reweaving the Landscape: The Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private
Ownership, 19 VT. L. REV. 363 (1995).
27. See, e.g., WORSmR, supra note 5, at 329-30.
28. Congress has increasingly used the budget process to indirectly repeal federal programs by refusing
to fund them or funding them at low levels. For a discussion of this practice on habitat conservation plans, see
Albert C. Lin, Participant's Experiences With Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining
the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 404-05 (1996).
29. For a criticial analysis of the current efforts to undermine environmental protection in the name of
federalism, see Robert L. Glicksman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) Contract With America, 5 KAN. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 13-14 (1996).
30. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,592-94 (1963).
31. See Morris Newman, New Deals for Colorado River Water Called 'Landmark': Vegas-MWD, San
Diego-Imperial Deals Cause Controversy, CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP., Feb. 1996, at 1 (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal).
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local land use entitlements which threaten to "take" a listed species. Federal
power was extended in 1995 when the United States Supreme Court upheld
Department of the Interior regulations which define the taking of a species to
include habitat modification? 2 But the aggressive exercise of this power will
trigger intense political opposition and takings challenges.33 There is a long
standing tension between national articulation of resource management goals and
local efforts to promote unrestricted access to natural resources for economic
exploitation. The tradition of local resistance to national conservation is well into
its second century; the current manifestation of this tension is the wise-use move-
ment which seeks to tie all regulation to statutory compensation in excess of that
required under federal or state constitutional law?' For political and adminis-
trative reasons, the Department of the Interior is now seeking cooperative species
protection programs.35
Third, the management of biodiversity is different from traditional natural
resources management issues for three reasons: (1) Biodiversity conservation is
not a simple negative spillover prevention problem that calls for national regu-
lation to adequately internalize social costs;36 (2) there are no national uniform
standards that can be applied to potential reserve areas; and (3) the protection of
habitat not found on public lands requires the exercise of federal powers that are
the most ill-adapted to habitat protection, fragmented and subordinate to state
implementation.
3 7
32. See Babbitt v. Sweethome Communities for Greater Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416-18 (1995).
33. Courts have rejected takings claims for damages caused by protected species. See, e.g., Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1428-31 (10th Cir. 1986); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324,
1334-35 (9th Cir. 1988). The takings issues raised by the Act are discussed in Susan Shaheen, The Endangered
Species Act: Inadequate Species Protection in the Wake of Destruction of Private Property Rights, 55 OHIo
ST. L.J. 453 (1994); Paula C. Murray, Private Takings of Endangered Species As Public Nuisance: Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council and the Endangered Species Act, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119 (1993);
and Michael A. Yuffee, Note, Prior Appropriations Water Rights: Does Lucas Provide a Takings Action
Against Federal Regulation Under the Endangered Species Act?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1217 (1993). Both the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) and section 404 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) create regulatory water rights. See, e.g., United
States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126,1133-34 (E.D. Cal. 1992); A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL.,
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 728-48 (1993).
34. For a modem example of a "wise use" legal victory, see Catron County Bd. of Commissioners v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996). Catron County, New Mexico is the
leader of'the modem western interposition movement to slow (stop) the designation of critical habitat for listed
species located in the county; it convinced the Tenth Circuit to hold that the designation of such habitat under
the Endangered Species Act requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The better reasoned position
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, in Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996), is that the designation of critical habitat is the functional equivalent of an EIS.
35. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the
United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 1598 (1994).
37. In addition, as discussed in notes 51-53, the Supreme Court is developing a neo-dual federalism
jurisprudence which limits federal power to direct the state to manage natural resources. For example, the use
of state agencies to implement federal policy is constitutionally suspect because it interferes with state
1636
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The crux of the problem is the attempted integration of ecosystem manage-
ment into real landscapes. Ecosystem management is creating a paradox in
federal-state relations: the achievement of effective biodiversity protection efforts
relies on unexercised rather than exercised federal power. Ecosystem manage-
ment collapses conventional political and property boundaries, and the integration
of public and private lands into a single functional unit makes local rather than
state governments much more important, especially for land use issues. As a
result, the importance of the science of conservation biology is magnified.
Science is the source of both substantive management principles, such as the
dedication of viable patches of habitat linked by biological corridors,38 and the
possibility for consensus. Conservation biology seeks to understand relationships
between species extinction and habitat fragmentation in order to develop models
to map on the ground management minimum habitat reserves for endangered
species.39 As a consequence, resource management generally is shifting from pre-
servation as the dominant biodiversity strategy to preservation as an integral
component of ecosystem restoration and adaptive management. °
The bottom line is that at best, ecosystems can be managed rather than
restored or preserved, and management will be a series of calculated risky experi-
ments.41 "[N]ature moves and changes and involves risks and uncertainties and
... our own judgments of our actions must be made against this moving target.
42
The basic management objective is to manage nature to mimic natural systems.
For example, adaptive management is now seen as the primary strategy because
it increases the possibility for consensus and makes possible the creation of
autonomy. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). For a defense of limits on the federal
government's power to compel state agencies to enforce federal regulatory programs, see Deborah J. Merritt,
Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1573-79 (1994).
38. See Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea, But What Is It, Will It Work, and
Who Will Pay?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES &ENV'T 42,44 (1995); James Drozdowski, Note, Saving an Endangered
Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 553, 592
(1995).
39. See REED Noss, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY 50-54 (1995). For a useful short review of the early
literature, see Bruce A. Wilcox & Dennis D. Murphy, Conservation Strategy: The Effects of Fragmentation
on Extinction, 125 AM. NATURALIST 879, 879-80 (1985).
40. For an examination of the impact of this paradigm shift on public lands policy, see Joseph L. Sax,
Proposals for Public Land Reform: Sorting Out the Good, the Bad and the Indifferent, 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W.
J. ENvH.. L. & POL'Y 187 (1996) and Joseph L. Sax, Nature and Habitat Conservation and Protection in the
United States, 20 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 47,55-56 (1993).
41. The notion that ecosystem management is an experiment is deeply disturbing to landowners and
government agencies because it frustrates the achievement of certainty. See infra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text. But, the notion of political life as an experiment is deeply embedded in our constitutional
tradition. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42. DANIEL B. BoTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIS: A NEw ECOLOGY FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY
190(1990).
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processes with self-correction mechanisms.43 The net result is that the search for
a permanent exclusive regulatory authority-the essence of federalism juris-
prudence-is counterproductive. National standards are replaced by "place-
driven" ones 4 in which cooperation requires the subordination rather than the
exercise of federal authority.
B. Classic Federalism Doctrines Do Not Help
Classic federalism doctrines are rapidly becoming dysfunctional or irrelevant
as all levels of government move from a single media or species approach to
cooperative ecosystem approaches to biodiversity management. Federalism
exacerbates tension between local and national "prerogatives" because the
essence of a federal system is the division of power between the national
sovereign and lesser sovereign units. This division either is based on a constitu-
tional scheme of power fragmentation or is justified as a means to match prob-
lems with competent jurisdictions.45 In our constitutional system, the emphasis
has been on the establishment of negative liberties or the location of regulatory
competence. Federalism, as interpreted by a narrow majority of the current
Supreme Court, is erroneously thought to require that allocations of power
between the federal government and the state be exclusive to protect the states
from the federal government.!
43. A recent National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences study captures the essence of
adaptive management:
Adaptive planning and management involve a decision making process based on trial, monitoring,
and feedback. Rather than developing a fixed goal and an inflexible plan to achieve the goal,
adaptive management recognizes the imperfect knowledge of interdependencies existing within and
among natural and social systems, which requires plans to be modified as technical knowledge
improves.
COMMITrEE ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & PUBLIC POLICY ET AL.,
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & PUBLIC POLICY 357 (1992) (copy on file
with the Pacific Law Journal).
44. See Thomas W. Jackson & Joshua S. Wyner, The New Hot Doctrine: Ecosystem Management,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at C6. In a more general survey of environmental federalism, Professor Breckenridge
reaches the same conclusion. Lee P. Breckenridge, Fractal Federalism: Evolving National State Relations in
U.S. Environmental Law, in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE U.S.A. AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE
FORME U.S.S.R. (James E. Hickey, Jr. & Alexej Ugrinksy eds., forthcoming 1996).
45. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1225-31 (1977) (writing before
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and identifying the three bases for national pollution control regulation:
(1) The promotion of intrastate welfare, (2) the prevention of interstate spillovers, and (3) the implementation
of national moral ideals).
46. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1117-33, cert. denied sub nom.
Alabama v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 116 S. CL 1415 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
166-67 (1992); see also Gardbaum, supra note 20, at 796.
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The Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence is problematic from a bio-
diversity perspective for three reasons. First, biodiversity protection is at best an
indirect goal of a federal system, and thus the Supreme Court's decisions are
often irrelevant. Second, Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence is an abstract
and backward-looking doctrine that seeks an ideal diffusion of power without a
clear articulation of the values sought to be advanced by this objective, which
makes it difficult to develop functional doctrines adapted to resource management
needs. 47 Third, judicial federalism is problematic for biodiversity protection,
which seeks permanent, scientifically driven solutions, because the balance of
power between the national and state governments can change in response to
shifts in political opinion. Thus, it is difficult to predict future doctrine and to
know if the expectations built into long term solutions will be frustrated in the
future.
Federalism jurisprudence continues to oscillate between radically different
views of the merits of a strong national government. Contemporary views range
from the theory that states are the central guardians of liberty48 against the
Leviathan to the view that they are historical accidents and thus the displacement
of state law (or states) by Congress raises "no normative principle.., that is
worthy of protection." 49 Prior to the New Deal, the constitutional assumption was
that regulatory power or competence must be exclusive either to the national
government or to the states in order to protect individual liberty through the
diffusion of regulatory power.5 However, the Court's rigid dual federalism
subordinated the Marshallian notion of a strong national government to deal with
new problems. During the New Deal, dual federalism was replaced with a
presumption of the necessity for federal regulation and the gradual realization that
political rather than judicial federalism was the best means to achieve the
constitutionally contemplated balance between the states and the national govern-
47. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rehabilitating Federalism, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1333, 1334 (1994)
(reviewing SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATIONAL: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993)).
This incoherence is symptomatic of the Burger-Rehnquist Court's retreat from constitutional adjudication
which articulates the national experience to arid scholasticism. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 98 (1993) (observing that
current Supreme Court opinions reflect "hardly a trace of wisdom concerning the meaning of the American
past or the possibilities of its future[,] .. . no picture of American ideals or destiny[,] ... no recognition that
the world is rapidly changing[,]and that the Court's understanding of the role of law may be growing
dangerously out of touch with American society").
48. Professor Akhil Reed Amar is a leading proponent of this view. See Akhil R. Amar, Five Views
of Federalism: "Converse- 1983" in Context, 47 VAD. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1994); Akhil R. Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1519 (1987).
49. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on A National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 909 (1994).
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1561-62 (1988) (locating
the "checking" function of federalism in both classic republican and pluralist political theory); see also Amar,
supra note 49, at 1492-1519 (arguing that the purpose of federalism is to create inter-govermental competition
to protect individual rights grounded in popular sovereignty).
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ment. The fruit of this non-dual federalism was the theory of cooperative or
"marble cake" federalism,51 which underlies the law of pollution reduction. In
cooperative federalism, the states become the agents of the national government.52
The principal focus of constitutional law shifted from concern about the infringe-
ment of reserved state authority to an inquiry into the congressional intent behind
the preemption of state regulatory authority.53
The immediate consequence of the shifting nature of federalism jurisprudence
for biodiversity protection is that post-New Deal federalism has in turn decayed
into a fragile and often dysfunctional balance between national and subordinate
authority. Cooperative federalism has proved better in theory than in practice,
and the New Deal faith in the need for national solutions has rapidly eroded in the
past twenty years.55 Instead of cooperative or "marble cake" federalism, we now
have either prefectorial federalism, characterized by federal mandates without the
necessary financial incentives to induce state compliance with them, or neo-dual
federalism,56 which seeks to compartmentalize governmental functions which
should in fact be shared. Both result in incomplete solutions to problems,
especially resource management problems. Prefectorial federalism would require
51. The term was coined by Morton Grodzins. See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A
NEw Viaw OF GovERNmENT IN THE UNITEm STATES 8-9 (1966).
52. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166-69 (rejecting cooperative federalism except in limited circumstances
where the federal government preempts state regulation).
53. The tradition of concern for state prerogatives, however, endures. See Deborah J. Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for the A Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17-22
(1988) (expressing support for state rights and maintenance of the federalist structure); Robert F. Nagel,
'Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League ofCities in Perspective, 1981 SiP. CT. REV. 81, 107-09;
see also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLum. L. REV. 1911, 1923-24 (1995)
(discussing the impact of Lopez on Congress's Spending Clause powers). See generally Symposium,
Federalism's Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1994) (addressing the future roles of state and federal govern-
ments).
54. The debate over the failure of New Deal federalism has centered on whether federal programs
become captured by the regulated or benefited community, or whether the efforts to isolate them from capture
make them excessively cumbersome and costly to implement. See PAUL E. PETERSON Er AL., WHEN
FEDERAuSm WORKS 7-10 (1986); see also Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management,
or Layered Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models From Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 3
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 193,207-08 (1996).
55. This decay can be traced in the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence which has evolved from
a weak to a strong formal preference for concurrent regulatory authority. Compare Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 rev'd sub nom. Rice v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 331 U.S. 247 (1947)
(ruling that absent a conflict with federal law, states may regulate matters not regulated by a federal act) with
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. California State Energy Resources & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,211-212 (1983)
and RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 153-54 (1986) (allowing for concurrent
regulation). The Court's application of the presumption remains hopelessly incoherent. Compare Wisconsin
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,616 (1991) (holding that federal pesticide law does not preempt local
regulation of pesticide application) with Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108-
09 (1992) (holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Act preempts state hazardous waste licensing
scheme).
56. See JOHN E. THORSON, RtVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE
MISsOURI RIVER 116 (1994).
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states to comply with federal mandates but not fund the compliance costs or pro-
vide other incentives to comply, while a neo-dual federalism re-delegates power
to the states with minimal federal controls!s
II. THE EMERGENCE OF PARTNERSHIP FEDERALISM
Several ambitious experiments are underway in southern California, Texas,
and other places to protect biodiversity through the creation of a system of
reserves. These experiments are part of a world-wide trend to move toward the
creation of bioregions as the appropriate management framework for sustainable
development.58 Habitat destruction is the major cause of the loss of biodiversity,
and thus the creation of habitat reserves is the best strategy to conserve bio-
diversity. Reserve creation is extremely difficult because of the conflict between
the scientific imperatives of ecosystem dynamics and institutional barriers.
Ecology teaches that whole ecosystems should be managed to promote their long
term sustainability, but the fragmented ownership and jurisdictional patterns that
are the legacy of settlement history make this a formidable challenge. Reserve
creation of public lands is difficult because lands within a single ecosystem are
often managed by different federal and state agencies with different management
mandates. Coordination is usually indirect. The management agencies have great
discretion to define biodiversity and to decide how it should be protected. For
example, they have no duty to protect biodiversity through the creation of
reserves. 59 The problems on private lands are even greater because we have
consistently rejected direct federal land use controls.6 Public and private land
management must be coordinated but neither the federal government nor the state
(except in a few states with statewide land use controls) can compel local units
of government to implement a reserve strategy.
The basic mismatch between law and conservation biology is our narrow
focus on permitting and procedure. The permit approach-be it endangered
species or wetlands-leads to a focus on individual species or small geographical
areas and is entirely reactive. The procedural approach, illustrated by review
57. Modem examples of neo-dual federalism decisions related to biodiversity include PUD No. I of
Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. 1900, 1914 (1994) (state can regulate releases
from a FERC licensed facility to protect downstream water quality); Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal
Comm., 480 U.S. 572, 584 (1986) (state can impose environmental conditions on mineral extraction in national
forest); and California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 672-74 (1978) (state can impose environmental
conditions on use of water from federal reservoir as long as federal purposes are not frustrated).
58. See Powell, supra note 9.
59. The leading case of Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 624 (7th Cir. 1995), holds that the Forest
Service has the discretion to decide how to implement that National Forest Management Act's mandate to
provide for biodiversity. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(g)(3) (West 1996). For a criticism of Marita, see Walter
Kuhlmann, Wildlife's Burden, in BIODIVERsrrY AND THE LAW 189 (William J. Snape II ed., 1996).
60. See John R. Nolon, National Land Use Planning: Revisiting Senator Jackson's 1970 Policy Act,
LAND USE & ZONING DIG., May 1996, at 3.
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under the California Environmental Quality Act, leads to case by case mitigation
deals that lack an ecosystem perspective.6' From a biodiversity perspective, both
the geographic and legal interpretation of permit-based programs can frustrate
necessary protection. Geographically, the net result is the approval of a permit
with mitigation conditions which can produce dysfunctional and poorly main-
tained habitats.6! 2 Permit programs were not intended to operate on large geo-
graphic scales, they were intended to insure site-specific compliance with
standards or administrative regulations. Because the environmental movement
began as a reaction to administrative discretion which attached little or no weight
to environmental protection, the emphasis has been on holding agencies to strict
compliance with statutes, especially procedural requirements. As the discussion
of the California NCCP program in section III.B. illustrates,63 the success of
biodiversity preservation often depends on the injection of some flexibility into
the interpretation of an agency's statutory authority in order to induce the
requisite stakeholders to cooperate to achieve an environmental objective.
The difficulty of adapting rigid legal frameworks to new realities is not con-
fined to biodiversity protection. New York City's recent afford to use industrial
zoning to foster small scale mixed use development in lower Manhattan and other
boroughs illustrates the demands that a rigid system places on market adaptation
and the need for some degree of "prosecutorial discretion" in interpreting a
statute.6 In 1974, New York City zoned more than 20,000 acres for industrial use
to preserve the city's eroding manufacturing base. Even New York City could not
stop global economic trends and the city lost two-thirds of its manufacturing base
in the next twenty years. But, many industrial areas are thriving because New
York has deliberately decided to allow developments contrary to those mandated
in the ordinance. The "creative" interpretation of "small retail store," the use
classification intended to allow only modest secondary commercial use to pre-
serve industrial space, illustrates the adaptation of a old regulatory scheme to
61. See, e.g., Gentry v. City of Murrieta, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1359, 1382-83,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170, 187
(1995). In a multiple California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) challenge to California Gnatcatcher and
Stevens's Kangaroo Rat protection plans, the court, found, inter alia, that the Gnatcatcher mitigation require-
ments were adequate. The objector produced a biologist from University of California, Riverside, who testified
that the mitigation measures were inadequate, but the court concluded that there was no fair argument, as
required by CEQA, to support the conclusion, largely because no independent scientific evidence was
introduced to corroborate the biologist's conclusion. A different conclusion was reached for the kangaroo rat
mitigation plan. The city approved off-site mitigation through the payment of fees and eventual implementation
of a local Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP). However, the city had not become part of the Riverside Kangaroo
Rat HCP and had not committed itself to do so. This was insufficient mitigation because the city's own
biological report indicated that the payment of fees without an HCP would be insufficient. The same point is
made about the ESA as an ecosystem protection act. See Adler, supra note 2, at 1054-56.
62. See Alyson Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology, and Law, DUKE ENVTL,
L. & POL'Y FORUM (forthcoming 1996) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).,
63. See infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
64. This paragraph is drawn from Kirk Johnson, Where a Zoning Law Failed, New York Finds Seeds
of a Revival, N.Y. TwS, Apr. 21, 1996, at 1.
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changed conditions. Only small retail stores are allowed in industrial zones, but
large supermarkets have been allowed by legally viewing them as a cluster of
separate retail stores, each under 10,000 square feet, the threshold that would
trigger exclusion under the ordinance. The growing Bed and Bath franchise was
allowed because it was classified as sui generis and thus not positively prohibited.
A. The Bay-Delta Framework Convention
The recent agreement between the federal government and the State of
California (styled "Club Fed")65 to manage the San Francisco Bay-Delta
illustrates the structural, as well as political limits of federal authority. For over
fifty years, California has been studying the impact of diversions on the fresh-to-
salt water balance in the Delta but declined to address the problem because it
would threaten the continued enjoyment of vested water rights.6 Increased flows
to maintain critical aquatic habitats are the major water-related environment issue
in the state. A 1994 California Department of Water Resources Planning Docu-
ment estimates that three million additional acre feet of water will be needed by
2000 to protect endangered species. In 1986, the issue came to a head when a
California appellate court held that state law requires the integration of water
quality and quantity allocation, in essence that the Delta cannot be allowed to
deteriorate.68 State efforts to augment Delta flows had been initially blocked by
San Joaquin and southern California water users. In the early 1990s, the federal
government threatened to "run" the Delta under the Clean Water and Endangered
Species Acts by setting water quality standards and listing species. However, in
1994 the federal government and the state reached a framework agreement on the
principles for the future management of the Delta.6 9
The Agreement is analogous to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change which commits the parties to stabilize greenhouse gases at a
level that prevents dangerous antropogentic change70 but defers the hard questions
of stabilization levels and north-south wealth and technology transfers until the
future. The Bay-Delta Agreement commits the federal government and the state
65. This is the State Resources Agency's tern for the various federal agencies which agreed not to
exercise immediately their full regulatory powers and joined together to allow the state to develop a Bay-Delta
plan.
66. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 590-96 (1991).
67. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENTOF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE: BULLETIN
160-93 (1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
68. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 119,227 Cal. Rptr. 161,
179-80 (1986).
69. For a detailed discussion of the principles, see A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
RESOURCES § 5.19[8] (1995) and Elizabeth A. Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability
67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (1996).
70. See Cynthia L. Koehler, California's Bay-Delta Agreement: A Model for Cooperation, RIVERS, Jan.
1995, at 46.
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to a long-term cooperative management experiment within the context of state
water law and existing federal environmental protection mandates! 1 Its success
depends on the establishment of long-term cooperation between state and federal
agencies and on the ability of both sides to develop ecosystem management
strategies based on sound continuously acquired scientific information. The
strategies must provide adequate environmental flows in periods of drought
within existing water entitlement allocations and permit a more flexible inter-
pretation of federal law.
Cooperation rather than preemption is required, moreover, to assemble the
necessary financial resources to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Both
federal and non-federal funds are necessary to solve the problem by flow
augmentation during periods of drought. The Agreement was facilitated by three
factors: (1) The Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA);72 (2)
the policy of Secretary of the Interior Babbitt to seek cooperative federal-state
ecosystem management strategies to achieve the objectives of the Endangered
Species Act and other federal environmental mandates without imposing undue
burdens on existing property right holds; and (3) the willingness of the Metro-
politan Water District of Southern California to guarantee a three-year $10
million annual commitment for non-flow strategies such as improved fish
screens. 73 The CVPIA enabled the federal government to shoulder the major
burden of meeting Delta water quality demands with the additional Central Valley
Project water. All Central Valley Project water will be credited against an
800,000 acre-foot block dedicated by Congress to fishery restoration in 1992,
with any additional water needs met through the purchase of existing entitle-
ments.74 Thus, California avoided-at least for the foreseeable future-
quantifying and curtailing a large portion of the state's water rights, although the
state must "immediately thereafter initiate water right proceedings to implement
the adopted plan." 75 For example, by 1998, the state must allocate the respon-
sibility among water right holders in the San Joaquin basin for seasonable flows
to protect Chinook Salmon.
7 6
71. Id.
72. See Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA), Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4707
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.A.).
73. See TARLOCK, supra note 69, § 5.19[8].
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. The crux of the Agreement is a seasonable Delta water export cap tied to the run-off of an eight-
river index. The Agreement expresses the hope that no new species will be listed until 1998 and that
"[c]ompliance with the take provisions of the biological opinions under the Federal... ESA is intended to
result in no additional loss of water supply annually within the limits of the water quality and operational
requirements of these Principles." Id. If additional species are listed for "unforeseen circumstances," no
additional Delta flows will be required. See id.
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B. Region-Wide Habitat Biodiversity Protection Plans
The Clinton Administration has recently negotiated several similar agree-
ments to resolve bitter land use disputes that have arisen under the Federal
Endangered Species Act. Such state-local-federal ongoing multi-species pro-
tection partnerships dramatically illustrate the emergence of a new federalism
model which is gradually replacing the threat of preemption with the promise of
no additional regulatory burdens. The Federal Endangered Species Act77 prohibits
government actions that jeopardize species that have been listed as threatened or
endangered. The Fish and Wildlife Service of the United States Department of the
Interior is authorized to list both individual species and the minimum critical
habitat necessary to sustain the species. 7 This portion of the Act primarily applies
to federal activities that occur on federal public land or to federally licensed
activities, although many states, including California, have adopted similar
programs. 79 But, other sections of the Act extend its coverage to both public and
private land. Section 9 of the ESA makes it a violation of the Act to "take" an
endangered species by destroying its habitat at least when there is a reasonable
causal chain between the habitat modification and the risk of species extinction.o
Section 9 makes every land development activity in an area that contains listed
species subject to the ESA.
The extension of the endangered species protection to private land was an
unexpected consequence of the legislation, and it has required a new local-federal
land use approval process to deal with land development and related activities in
areas with a listed species. In 1982, Congress added section 10 to the federal
ESA.8' Section 10 authorizes the federal government to approve local land use
regulatory programs as Habitat Conservation Plans (HCP). If the Fish and
Wildlife Service finds that development outside the reserve will not "appreciably
reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species in the wild,"
development done pursuant to an approved HCP is an incidental take under
section 9.82 The first generation of HCPs were single species plans adopted to
allow development to proceed. Local governments and developers basically
77. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531- 1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
78. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533 (West 1985).
79. CAL. FIsH& GAME CODE §§ 2051-2052 (West 1994).
80. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for Great Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2409-10
(1995). The Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, has reached the same result. Corkill v. Forestry
Comm'n of New S. Wales, 73 A.L.G.R. 126, affd73 A.L.G.R. 247 (1991).
81. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539 (West 1985).
82. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(2)(B)(iv) (West 1985). A California Court of Appeal has held that California's
failure to include a provision similar to § 10 in its Endangered Species Act, California Fish and Game Code
§§ 2051-2192 (West 1984), deprives the state of the authority to authorize incidental takes pursuant to habitat
conservation agreements. See San Bernardino Audubon Soc'y v. City of Moreno Valley, 44 Cal. App. 4th 593,
603, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 903 (1996).
1645
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
agreed to finance a habitat reserve scheme to preserve the species. Developers
conveyed land to a public entity, and the city raised money for additional habitat
reserves either by generation obligation bonds or by exactions on new land
development. HCPs continue the species by species approach and thus provide
no protection to developers and local communities that subsequently discovered
species will not require the conservation of a new and different habitat.
Conservation biology teaches that multiple-species reserves should be created
to preserve ecosystems, not individual species. This is an application of the
theory of island biology. This concept can be attractive to local communities and
developers if a reserve system will cover future as well as presently listed species.
The second generation of habitat conservation plans is distinguished by ambitious
objectives beyond the conservation of a threatened or endangered species. First,
the plans are multiple rather than single species oriented. 84 Second, as the Califor-
nia program described below illustrates, the geographic scale of the protection
effort is much broader. New programs encompass more scientifically functional
boundaries such as a watershed or bioregion. Third, these new programs are
prophylactic rather than reactive. The hope is that a sufficiently large reserve will
avoid the necessity to list additional species in the region because the reserve will
ensure their viability.
1. Multiple Species Habitat Protection in Southern California
California is pioneering the second generation HCP process. To avoid listing
a threatened song bird in southern California under the state8 5 and federal
endangered species acts, California passed the Natural Community Conservation
Act in 1991.86 This Act provides a framework for voluntary local government and
private landowner participation in the preparation of Natural Community Con-
servation Plans (NCCPs) for the protection of those natural areas that provide
habitat for a variety of rare and other species.87 These plans are to be large scale,
83. The importance of a city either establishing a reserve or participating in a county or region habitat
conservation is illustrated by Gentry v. City of Murrieta, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1359, 1421-22,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170,
212-13 (1995) (holding that off-site mitigation plan for Stevens' Kangaroo Rat prepared under California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) violated CEQA because the city did not participate in the Riverside
County Kangaroo Rat HCP).
84. See Lindell L. Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New Paradigm
for Conserving Biological Diversity, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 115 (1994).
85. For an analysis of differences between the CESA and the Federal ESA and the ways in which the
CESA can be adapted to the NCCP process, see Lynn E. Dwyer & Dennis D. Murphy, Fulfilling the Promise:
Reconsidering and Reforming the California Endangered Species Act, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 735 (1995).
86. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800-2840 (West Supp. 1996).
87. The Act authorizes any person or governmental agency to prepare a Natural Community
Conservation Plan (NCCP) pursuant to an agreement with, and guidelines written by, the Department of Fish
and Game. id. §§ 2810, 2820, 2825 (West Supp. 1996). Each such plan is to promote "protection and
perpetuation of natural wildlife diversity, while allowing compatible and appropriate development and growth."
Id. § 2805 (West Supp. 1996). Once the Department of Fish and Game approves an NCCP, the Department
1646
1996 /Federalism Without Preemption
multi-species equivalents of existing Habitat Conservation Plans authorized under
the Federal Endangered Species Act. 8 They are intended to cover a larger geo-
graphical area and to include listed and unlisted species. The hope is that a
sufficiently large reserve will avoid the necessity for local governments and land
owners to undertake additional mitigation measures should additional species be
listed in the future. The Act allows the state to authorize takes if it determines an
approved NCCP program provides adequate conservation and management for
identified species.8 9
To implement the NCCP program, the State Resources Agency selected as
a pilot project the "coastal sage scrub" terrain of Orange and San Diego Counties
in southern California, a region that had already witnessed a number of trouble-
some conflicts under the existing endangered species legislation. The objective
is to study and resolve conflicts at an early stage in the process by the people with
the most expertise in the relevant areas. The on-going southern California NCCP
process is both biologically and legally interesting. The legal interest comes from
the efforts to adapt the federal ESA multi-species protection. The ESA is not
primarily a habitat conservation statute,9 but the Act is being adapted to this
objective to avoid the exercise of the section 10 implied power to preempt state
and local land use controls when a listed species is potentially present within the
jurisdiction." The Department of the Interior has relied on the special listing rules
under section 4(d).92 Section 4(d) allows the Department to list a species as
threatened (but not endangered), but to use state or local land use authority as the
may authorize developments that might otherwise be found to have an adverse impact on listed or candidate
species if they are consistent with the NCCP. Id. §§ 2081, 2825(c), 2835 (West Supp. 1996).
88. See Jason M. Patlis, Biodiversity, Ecosystems and Species: Where Does the Endangered Species
Act Fit In?, 8 TuL. ENVTL. LJ. 33, 59-61 (1994).
89. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2835 (West Supp. 1996). A court of appeal has held that the state ESA
does not authorize takes because there is no HCP approval process, but the court did not consider the
applicability of the NCCP Act. San Bernardino Audubon Soc'y v. City of Moreno Valley, 44 Cal. App. 4th
593, 602-05, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 903-04 (1996).
90. Only 16% of federal ESA listings are accompanied by critical habitat designation and a habitat may
be excluded for economic reasons or because the designation will encourage destruction. See Oliver A. Houck,
The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation By the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64
U. CoLO. L. REV. 277, 302 (1993). The failure to designate a habitat does not preclude ajeopardy finding. See
United States v. Glenn Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 1992). However, the failure
to designate makes it easier to find no jeopardy. See Pyramid Lake Piaute Tribe of Indians v. United States
Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th
Cir. 1976).
91. The limits of this power have not been tested but the on-going litigation to curtail pumping from
the Edwards Aquifer between Austin and San Antonio, Texas, may test the limits of federal power when the
state and local agencies do not cooperate to carry out the mandates of the ESA. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3361 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993).
92. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(d) (West 1985).
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protection mechanism.93 The basic theory is that plans prepared pursuant to the
NCCP will be approved by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the
California Department of Fish and Game as section 10(a) permits and that these
plans will be treated as adequate HCP's for any subsequently listed species.?
4
Initially, the agencies selected a Scientific Review Panel of conservation
biologists to develop a set of conservation biology guidelines for a workable
NCCP for the coastal sage scrub.95 Much of the recent research on planning
methodologies for habitat protection has concentrated on the design of "reserves,"
which would be large areas that would be managed to maintain or recreate natural
habitat conditions.96 Ideally, the reserves should cover the entire bioregion, but
this is impossible in a densely populated area such as southern California. These
methodologies have been used for rare species, such as the desert tortoise, and
northern spotted owl, that occupied large areas of public land desired for uses
inconsistent with habitat maintenance. For the coastal sage scrub, however,
neither the federal nor the state governments can assemble significant funds for
true bioregional habitat acquisition, and only a small proportion of the remaining
habitat is located on public land. Although land acquisition authority is lacking,
the statute does authorize the state to use permitting authority to enforce approved
NCCPs,97 but the pilot program contemplated that the actual application of the
planning methodology would be undertaken by the local agencies and private
coalitions that would prepare the NCCPs pursuant to the scientists' guidelines and
would be enforced by local government through consistency requirements.9 8
An initial scientific review panel was convened to suggest conservation
guidelines. The actual construction of the reserve was, however, an exercise in the
possible. The initial 37,000 acre reserve for Orange County reflects a cellular
design; there are two initial unconnected large coastal sage scrub subregions, one
clustered between Irvine and Laguna Beach and the other at the base of the Santa
Ana Mountains in Orange County. Some environmentalists have criticized the
93. The Department of the Interior has proposed a complex 4(d) rule, Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Special Rule for the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl on Non-Federal
Lands, 60 Fed. Reg. 9484 (1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), to protect the spotted owl on non-federal
lands in California and Washington State and to lift the blanket prohibitions against "takes" imposed by federal
injunctions.
94. See Memorandum of Understanding By and Between the California Department of Fish and Game
and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service Regarding Coastal Sage Scrub Natural Community Con-
servation Planning in Southern California, Dec. 4, 1991 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
95. See, e.g., Peter F. Brussard, The Role of Ecology in Biological Conservation, 1 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 6 (1991); Michael E. Gilpin & Michael E. Soul6, Minimum Viable Populations: Processes of
Species Evxinclion, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF SCARCITY AND DIVERSITY (Miqhael E. Sould
ed., 1986); Reed F. Noss, Protecting NaturalAreas in Fragmented Landscapes, 7 NAT. AREAS J. 1 (1987).
96. See Michael E. Sould, Land Use Planning and Willife Maintenance: Guidelines for Conserving
Wildlife in an Urban Landscape, 57 J. AM. PLAN. AsS'N 313, 313-15 (1991).
97. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2081,2825(c), 2835 (West Supp. 1996).
98. See DANIELJ. CURTIN, JR., CALIFORNIA LAND-UsE AND PLANNING LAW 26-28 (1991).
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cells for lack of scientific review and connectivity," but on April 16, 1996, the
Orange County Board of Supervisors formally approved the Central/Coastal
Orange County Subregion of the Coastal Sage Scrub Natural Community Con-
servation Program.1°°
Multiple species conservation plans have an inherent tension between the
federal government's power to protect species on a case by case basis and to
revise existing permits and land owners' desire for a reserve and other protection
duties which will not be revised in the future. The existing ESA gives the federal
government power to revise existing permits and to require new permits in the
future should conditions change or new species be listed. The Agreement attempts
to adapt the section 10 species plan by species plan HCP process to the creation
of a permanent reserve and adaptive management program that creates land
owner incentives by providing a high but not absolute level of immunity from
additional mitigation duties for future listed species or errors in the initial reserve
designs.
The key to the resolution of this tension is the 1994 Department of the Interi-
or Assurances Policy.'01 The policy, popularly known as the "no surprises"
policy, is premised on legislative history which gives the Department the
authority to protect unlisted as well as listed species.t°2 The Assurances Policy
goes to the limits of the basic constitutional doctrine that the sovereign cannot
contract away the police power0 3 by promising that once a Habitat Conservation
Plan is approved, no new reserve dedications or other mitigation measures will
be allowed except in "extraordinary circumstances." 1 4 As further refined in the
Orange County Implementing Agreement, the Fish and Wildlife Service may still
list additional species and issue section 10(a) permits for them, but it promises to
condition a section 10(a) permit on the dedication of additional land only if alter-
99. See Deborah Schoch, 37,000-Acre Preserve Finds Its Place in O.C., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996,
at Al.
100. See IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT REGARDING THE NATURAL COMMUNITY CONSERVATION PLAN
FOR THE CENTRAL/COASTAL ORANGE COUNTY SUBREGION OF THE COASTAL SAGE ScRUB NATURAL
COMMUNITY CONSERVATION PROGRAM (1996) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTAION AGREEMENT] (copy on file with
the Pacific Law Journal).
101. U.S. DEPARTMENTS OF THE INTERIOR AND COMMERCE, NO SURPRISES: ASSURING CERTAINTY FOR
PRIVATE LANDOWNERS IN ENDANGERED SPEciES ACT HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING (1994) (Joint
Statement of Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce) [hereinafter ASSURING PRIVATE LANDOWNERS] (copy
on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
102. See H. R. REP. No. 97-835, at 30- 31 (1982).
103. The doctrine rests on the principle that the federal government cannot be estopped to exercise the
police power. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879). For an analysis of the federal government's
possible legal obligations, see Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act:
No Surprises & the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371,391-97 (1996).
104. ASSURING PRIVATE LANDOWNERS, supra note 101, at 208.
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native protection mechanisms, such as recovery plans,10 5 have been exhausted.
The additional land is necessary to avoid jeopardy to the species, and the
proposed additional mitigation measures are the least burdensome to the land-
owners.0 6 This policy should, along with other incentives, encourage more public
and private participation in multiple species protection plans because local land
use plans define the substantive protection mandates. San Diego County and the
Department of the Interior recently agreed to a set of principles which will allow
the NCCP to go forward in that county. °7 It provides that participants "will be
given assurances that a 'deal is a deal,' and that no additional financial obligations
will be imposed to conserve species that are identified and covered by the
plan." 08
2. The Balcones Canyonlands
A similar experiment is underway in the Hill Country southwest of Austin,
Texas. The Balcones Canyonlands are a state and perhaps national biodiversity
"hot spot" due to the fact that Austin did not become a major city until the 1970s.
To resolve an especially protracted dispute in the Hill Country around Austin
after the county voted down a bond issue in 1995 to finance habitat acquisition,
t19
Secretary Babbitt agreed to open land to development under a plan which creates
marketable mitigation certificates to finance a 30,000 acre habitat reserve for two
songbirds and six cave bugs."10 Developers may purchase "Participation Fee
Certificates" from governments who have contributed land or funds to a reserve
program to mitigate capital improvements."' The hope is that the $2750 to $5500
per acre cost of the certificates will be cheaper than the $9000 per acre that has
historically been spent on mitigation in the Balcones Canyonlands. Landowner
participation is voluntary," 2 and the details on local government implementation
105. Recovery plans, which include translocation of a species, are an increasingly used protection
strategy, see Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species
Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 32 (1996), and may be mandatory when a species is at extreme risk and previous
protection efforts have not succeeded, see Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *45-49.
106. See IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, supra note 100, at 101.
107. CrrYOFSAN DmGO, ErAL., MuLT,'LE SEc Es CONSERVAION PROGRAM (1996) (copy on file with
the Pacific Law Journal).
108. Id. at 2.
109. See Ruh], supra note 22, at 17. For a pessemistic assessment of the habitat conversation efforts in
Austin, Texas, see CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHoIcE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED
SPEchEs 176-211 (1995).
110. U.S. DEPARTmENTr OF THE INTERIOR, BALCONES CANYONLANDS CONSERVATION PLAN (BCCP):
SHARED VISION (1995) (draft version) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
111. Seeid.
112. Individual landowners may still seek section 10(a) permits. See id.
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are "in process,"' 3 but the project displays a surprising ability to endure in the
face of hostile opposition. As of early 1996, 21,000 out of 30,000 acres had been
acquired by public purchase, developer donation and Nature Conservancy
purchases."14
IV. CONCLUSION
The net result of these biodiversity protection experiments is an attempt to
encourage partnership federalism. In contrast to previous models of cooperative
federalism, partnership federalism, which allows state and local governments to
define the content of federal mandates, is increasingly characterized by multi-
party agreements and federal waivers of power rather than preemption. The
Orange County Implementation Agreement defines the location of the reserves
and special linkage areas, creates a future governance mechanism, creates a
mitigation option for nonparticipating landowners, and tries to create sufficient
landowner incentives that encourage them to give often, but not too often. If it
works, the federal ESA will have been transformed from a centralized permit
program to a federal performance standard program similar to the Coastal Zone
Management Act."
5
In the end, however, partnership federalism still rests on latent federal
supremacy, but as a recent evaluation of a similar California program that seeks
to promote voluntary public and private biodiversity conservation programs con-
cludes:
In order for this approach to work, the threat of an endangered or
threatened species listing must be close enough to motivate landowners
to participate in a voluntary effort to conserve habitat, but not so close
that species might actually be listed before the voluntary program can get
off the ground .... 116
113. On February 7, 1995, the Texas Capital Area Builders Association withdrew from the task force
studying the plan because they hope to repeal or substantially weaken the ESA. See Amy Smith, Builders Walk
From BCCP, AUSTIN Bus. J., Feb. 10, 1995, at 1. See generally TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND URBAN GROWTH 173-93 (1994).
114. See William K. Stevens, Texas Balancing Act Is Succeeding, N.Y. TIME, Feb. 27, 1996, at C4.
115. See Ruhl, supra note 22, at 643-71.
116. Jon Weiner, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: An Ecosystem Approach to Protecting
Endangered Species, 47 STAN. L. REV. 319, 346 (1995). Professor Breckenridge's study of the Northern Forest
Lands Council, a six-year U.S. Forest Service exploration of ecosystem management in upper New York State
and northern New England, reached a similar conclusion. "Partnerships for managing ecosystems are best seen
as attempts to develop new hybrid forms of decision-making, a 'third way,' that is decentralized and 'private'
enough to allow diverse, semi-autonomous action, but at the same time centralized and 'public' enough to
achieve coordination on a region-wide basis." Breckenridge, supra note 26, at 409.
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The limited ability of the federal government to protect biodiversity both on
its own public lands and on private property has forced the federal government
to induce state and local cooperation to implement national objectives." 7 A more
functional and less abstract concept of federalism can support this experiment."'
Courts can encourage state and local biodiversity initiatives that do not conflict
with congressional policies by sanctioning constitutionally-supported national
biodiversity protection responses.
117. This is a world-wide trend. See KENTON R. MILLER, BALANCING THE SCALES: GUIDELINES FOR
INCREASING BIODIVERISTY'S CHANCES THROUGH BIOREGIONAL MANAGIENT 56-58 (1996).
118. Cf. Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1480
(1994) ("as people find government farther away and less accessible, they may seek to find mechanisms of
governance more accountable and closer to home").
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